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Antagonistic coevolution between hosts and parasites can have a major impact on host population struc-
tures, and hence on the evolution of social traits. Using stochastic modelling techniques in the context of
bacteria–virus interactions, we investigate the impact of coevolution across a continuum of host–parasite
genetic specificity (specifically, where genotypes have the same infectivity/resistance ranges (matching
alleles, MA) to highly variable ranges (gene-for-gene, GFG)) on population genetic structure, and on
the social behaviour of the host. We find that host cooperation is more likely to be maintained towards
the MA end of the continuum, as the more frequent bottlenecks associated with an MA-like interaction
can prevent defector invasion, and can even allow migrant cooperators to invade populations of defectors.
Keywords: coevolution; genetic specificity; cooperation; bacteria; virus
1. INTRODUCTION
The maintenance of cooperation is an evolutionary con-
undrum: why invest resources if the benefits of the
investment are returned to other individuals? A major
line of explanation for the persistence of cooperation in
the face of non-investing ‘cheats’ is that the benefits gen-
erated by cooperators return preferentially to cooperative
individuals, as a result of non-random population struc-
ture [1–6]. Here, we extend the study of cooperation by
turning our focus to a ubiquitous driver of population
structuring: parasites.
Parasites shape host populations owing to the dele-
terious effects they have on their hosts [7,8]. Given that
parasites rely on their hosts for resources, changes in the
host population composition will also impact upon parasite
demography and genetic structure [9]. A tight genetic
interaction between hosts and pathogens can lead to on-
going host–parasite coevolution, defined as the reciprocal
evolution of interacting hosts and parasites [10]. The inter-
action is usually antagonistic, and selects for hosts to evolve
resistance and parasites to evolve infectivity. A key conse-
quence of coevolution is the impact on genetic diversity
of host and parasite populations, although this will critically
depend on the type of coevolution dynamics. At one
extreme, coevolution follows an arms race dynamics
(ARD), with directional selection for increasing resistance
and infectivity, purging diversity. At the other is fluctuating
selection dynamics (FSD), where parasite genotypes
specialize on host genotypes, potentially resulting in the
maintenance of large amounts of host and parasite genetic
diversity in time and space [11–13].
An important determinant of coevolutionary dynamics
is the underlying specificity. The two most common rep-
resentations of specificity are the matching alleles (MA)
model and the gene-for-gene (GFG) model, although
other variants exist, for example [14]. MA models are
based upon a system of self/non-self recognition mol-
ecules where hosts can successfully defend against any
parasite genotype that does not match their own
[15,16]. Typical of many invertebrate immune systems,
MA models assume that one parasite genotype will have
a different subset of susceptible hosts than another para-
site genotype. Infection is therefore determined by both
the host and parasite genotypes, with such tight specifi-
city sometimes leading to FSD [17]. The GFG model,
favoured by plant pathologists, predicts whether infection
is successful based on the interaction between resistance
loci and virulence loci [13,18,19]. GFG models are
often characterized by directional ARD [18,20,21],
which can lead to the evolution of generalist parasites
[22], although if there are costs associated with increased
resistance/infectivity ranges, FSD can also arise [13,21].
As with coevolutionary dynamics themselves, MA and
GFG models can be understood as the two extremes of a
continuum of specificity, and the interactions between
most hosts and parasites are likely to lie somewhere
between the two extremes with some degree of specializ-
ation and some generalization. Agrawal & Lively [13]
investigated the dynamics of hybrid MA–GFG models
via the use of a single parameter which formed a conti-
nuum: MA at one extreme and GFG at the other.
Accurate characterizations of specificity patterns have
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important consequences for predicting the evolution of
virulence [23,24], patterns in local adaptation [25–27]
and the evolution of recombination [18,28]. Now we
ask: how does genetic specificity shape host–parasite co-
evolution, host population genetic structuring and in
turn, the maintenance of host cooperation?
A recent study on cooperation in a bacterial model system
highlighted that strong selection on the host population
(adaptation to the passaging environment and to an antag-
onistic phage virus) allowed a primarily cooperative host
population to purge low-frequency cheats, presumably
owing to cooperator alleles hitchhiking on beneficial resist-
ance mutations [29]. Using a fully stochastic model of
host–parasite dynamics, we dissect this bacteria–phage
interaction, and extend to a coevolutionary time-scale, span-
ning GFG and MA mechanisms of interaction. We predict
that the MA limit is the most favourable for the maintenance
of cooperation because of increased genetic turnover
allowing repeated purges of rare defector alleles.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
We follow a stochastic framework widely used in population
dynamics [30]. Numerical simulations were performed
using an exact method, the Gillespie algorithm [31]. The
analysis takes place within the framework of an ecological
model of the infection of bacteria by lytic phages, using sto-
chastic population dynamics. The parameter values used are
based on biologically realistic values [32].
(a) Simple host–parasite model
To start with, we consider a single type of host (a bacterium)
and its parasite (a virus—in particular, a lytic phage). The
changes in the discrete numbers of bacterial hosts nH and
free-living viruses nV are due to four processes: host birth,
competition among hosts, virus death and lysis of a bacter-
ium by a phage (resulting in the instantaneous death of the
bacterium and the release of y copies of the virus; we
assume that the latent period is negligible). They can be
captured using the following reactions:
H b! 2H; 2H c! H ; V d! ; H þ V p! yV :
From these microscopic reaction rates, we can derive
equations for the average concentrations of hosts and para-
sites (see electronic supplementary material, S1), H and V,
which follow the deterministic trajectories (in a mean-field
approximation):
dH
dt
¼ bH 1 H
b=c
 
 pVH
and
dV
dt
¼ pðy 1ÞVH  dV :
The system is similar to a predator–prey system [33], dif-
fering solely in the interpretation and magnitude of the
quantity y which stands for the burst size and is of order
10–100—while in a predator–prey system the quantity
(y–1) would be termed ecological efficiency and takes a
value less than 1.
(b) Host–parasite coevolution model
The simplest scenario that allows for host–parasite coevolu-
tion is that between two types of host and two types of
parasite. Using the notation of a single locus and two alleles,
we will call the hosts Ha and HA and allow for mutations
among them, and similarly for the two types of parasite
Va and VA.
Depending on the model of specificity, the infectivity and
susceptibility ranges of host and parasite (i.e. the parameters
of the four different lysis reactions that can in principle take
place) will vary. As in Agrawal & Lively [13], we will use
a single parameter q to translate across the MA–GFG
continuum (MA: q ¼ 0, GFG: q ¼ 1). The parameter p rep-
resents the binding efficiency of a specialist virus (which can
only bind to one host type) and pg (p) the binding efficiency
of a generalist virus (which can bind to two different host
types). We have chosen the form of these interactions to be
a linear interpolation from MA to GFG, as summarized
in table 1.
When q ¼ 0 (at the MA end of the continuum), there are
two specialist host–parasite pairs: (Va, Ha) and (VA, HA).
When q ¼ 1 (at the GFG end), one virus is a specialist (Va
can only infect Ha) but the other one is a generalist (VA can
infect both Ha and HA), albeit at the cost of a smaller binding
efficiency. From the point of view of the hosts, HA carries a
resistance allele (to Va) and incurs in a cost of resistance in
the form of a death rate z that scales with q. Therefore, the reac-
tions that we must add to the ones considered in the simple
host–parasite model are
Ha  !
mH
HA; Va  !mV VA; HA qz! 
and
VaþHa p1! yVa; VAþHa p3! yVA; VAþHA p4! yVA:
Starting from the stochastic formulation and proceeding
as in the previous simple host–parasite model, we can
derive the following deterministic equations for the evolution
of the average concentrations of hosts and parasites (see elec-
tronic supplementary material, S1):
dHa
dt
¼ bHa 1Ha þHA
b=c
 
þ mHðHA HaÞ
Hað p1Va þ p3VAÞ;
dHA
dt
¼ bHA 1Ha þHA
b=c
 
 qzHA
 mHðHA HaÞ  p4VAHA;
dVa
dt
¼ p1ðy 1ÞVaHa þ mV ðVA  VaÞ  dVa
and
dVA
dt
¼ ðy 1ÞVAð p3Ha þ p4HAÞ
 mV ðVA  VaÞ  dVA:
Note that there is no direct competition between para-
sites, only an indirect one due to sharing common prey
(hosts) when q . 0. The effect of q can be interpreted as a
modification of the structure of the host–parasite network
Table 1. Interaction parameters (lysis rates) for the four
host–parasite pairs of the coevolution model (§2b).
Ha HA
Va p(;p1) 0
VA qpg(;p3) qpgþ (1 2 q)p(;p4)
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of interactions (see electronic supplementary material, S6).
This coevolution model can in fact be taken to be a minimal
motif within a generic host–parasite food web. The change
from q ¼ 0 (MA) to q ¼ 1 (GFG) corresponds to the
change from a modular to a nested network structure (diag-
onal and lower-triangular interaction matrices, respectively).
For a recent study about the structure of experimental
bacteria–phage networks, see Flores et al. [34].
In our model, there is no clear time-scale separation
between the ecological and the evolutionary dynamics
(between the dynamics on and of the host–parasite network).
Evolutionary dynamics here refers to the mutations allowed
within the definition of the model (not to the evolution of
the strength of the host–parasite links i.e. of q itself—that
is left for future work). The stochastic population dynamics
will take the ecosystem through a series of network confi-
gurations, as nodes are populated and links activated—due
to mutations—or removed—due to extinctions. For an
example of a model of community assembly and for further
references, see Capita´n & Cuesta [35].
(c) Cooperation and coevolution model
We introduce a third model by adding a cooperation–
defection dilemma to the coevolution model described in
§2b. Now every host has two traits: the original one (that
determines resistance to parasites) labelled by a and A,
plus a social trait labelled C for cooperators and D for defec-
tors. So we consider four types of host in total: Ca, Da, CA
and DA, as well as the two types of viruses Va and VA.
We capture the social dilemma posed by the interaction
between cooperators and defectors by cooperators paying a
fixed cost (w), while providing benefits to every individual
in the local population, be they a cooperator or a defector.
Specifically, we include an extra birth rate for all hosts, pro-
portional to the fraction of cooperators in the population (see
electronic supplementary material, S1). The reactions we
must add are the cost of cooperation and mutations in the
cooperation–defection trait:
Ca w! ; CA w! ; Ca  !mcd Da; CA  !mcd DA:
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To analyse the influence of host–parasite coevolution on
the maintenance of host cooperation, we take a step-wise
approach. First, we consider the impact of host evolution
on host genetic structure, in the face of a static environ-
mental challenge (following Morgan et al. [29]). We then
introduce coevolutionary dynamics, without explicit
cooperation and defection, to explore the basic impacts
on host structure of reciprocal evolutionary antagonism.
Finally, we analyse the full model, to track the fate of
cooperation in the context of antagonistic coevolution.
(a) Host evolution only
We begin by simplifying the full model (§2c) by removing
parasite evolution (starting with Va only and setting
mV ¼ 0), in order to mimic the system studied in
Morgan et al. [29]. In agreement with Morgan et al.
[29], we find that strong selection on a non-social trait
(here parasite resistance) generates positive frequency-
dependent selection for cooperation (see figure 1 and
the electronic supplementary material, S2). The simple
heuristic model in Morgan et al. [29] offered an interpret-
ation for this effect: because beneficial non-social
mutations are more likely to arise in the numerically
dominant cooperator population, the cooperation allele
is likely to hitchhike with these beneficial mutations that
sweep through the population. However, the model paid
for its simplicity with a number of stringent assumptions:
no cost of cooperation, no demographic dynamics, deter-
ministic gene frequency change and no coevolution.
Introducing a cost of cooperation in our explicitly
dynamical and stochastic framework illustrated that, as
the relative cost of cooperation increases, cooperators
are required to be initially present at higher frequencies
in order for cooperation to be maintained (figure 1).
When there is no cost of cooperation, the positive
frequency-dependent effect of strong selection favours
the maintenance of the more common genotype (more
than 50%). As the cost of cooperation is increased, this
‘break-even’ threshold is shifted towards higher frequen-
cies of cooperators, as the intrinsic cheater advantage to
defectors becomes increasingly important. This result
aids the interpretation of Morgan et al.’s experimental
results, where the break-even point ranged from about 90
per cent cooperators (environment and phage adaptation)
to about 98 per cent cooperators (environment adaptation
only). These biases from the purely symmetrical ‘survival
of the commonest’ result (figure 1, w ¼ 0) reflect an increas-
ing cost of cooperation, relative to the presumed benefits of
adaptation to the environmental challenge.
The Morgan et al. [29] model predicted that the fre-
quency-dependent effect highlighted in figure 1 would
break down at low densities (as neither cooperator nor
defector lineages are likely to gain resistance) and also
at high densities (as both are likely to gain resistance,
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Figure 1. Relative fitness of cooperators across different start-
ing frequencies, for increasing cost of cooperation w (see
§3a and the electronic supplementary material, S2). Co-
operators demonstrate positive frequency-dependent
selection. The curve is shifted to the right as the cost of co-
operation increases, i.e. higher initial frequencies of
cooperators are required to maintain cooperation. Parameter
values: b1 ¼ 0.2b0 (except in the w ¼ 0 curve, where
b1¼ 0), q ¼ 0, mV ¼ 0, mcd ¼ mH ¼ 1025 h21, b0 ¼ 1 h21,
K ¼ b0/c ¼ 106 ml21, p ¼ 1026 ml h21, y ¼ 50, d ¼ 0.2 h21,
volume ¼ 1 ml, final time tf ¼ 100 h, statistics over 200
runs per parameter set. Initial conditions: Va ¼ 106 ml21,
Caþ Da ¼ 103 ml21, VA ¼ CA ¼ DA ¼ 0.
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again removing the relative advantage to either lineage).
In figure 2, we revisit these predictions, and find in con-
trast that the frequency-dependent effect is robustly
maintained at higher densities. Our explicitly dynamical
and stochastic model allows resistance mutations to be
separated in time, so even if at high densities both lineages
are likely to gain a critical resistance mutation, there is
still a decisive advantage to gaining the resistance muta-
tion first—and this is more likely to be the case in the
dominant (higher frequency) lineage.
(b) Host–parasite coevolution
We now turn our focus to the effects of coevolution on the
host population dynamics, first in the absence of any
social conflict (as described in §1b). Note that the recipro-
cally antagonistic nature of the bacteria–virus interaction
can readily lead to instability, and loss of the pairing in a
spatially unstructured population [36]. In order for the
system to be stable (i.e. for hosts and parasites to coexist,
without global extinctions), a substantial cost of general-
ism must be imposed (see the electronic supplementary
material, S4), both on the resistant host and on the gen-
eralist parasite. A cost of wider viral infectivity range is
expressed in our model in terms of a reduced binding effi-
ciency, consistent with experimental data [37] and a
trade-off mechanism based on antagonistic pleiotropy
[38], i.e. mutations that allow the virus to infect a broader
host range trade off against viral productivity. A cost of
generalized resistance is captured in our model via an
intrinsic per capita cost to the bacterial host, consistent
with experimental data [39–43].
Following the establishment of a robust coexistence
regime (see the electronic supplementary material,
figure S4), we turn to an analysis of host population
bottlenecks as a function of the specificity of the genetic
interaction between host and parasite. Consistent with
Agrawal & Lively [13], we observe a reduced number of
host population bottlenecks as q is increased—i.e.
moving from MA to GFG (figure 3). Underlying each
bottleneck is in fact an attempt of invasion by the A gen-
otype (originated by a mutation) into the resident a
population. The structure of the host–parasite network
of interactions, fixed by the value of q (see electronic sup-
plementary material, S6), determines the outcome.
Invasion attempts fail repeatedly at the MA end, as the
invading HA genotype causes an explosion in its specialist
opponent VA, which in turn abruptly depletes the HA
population in a negative feedback loop (so we observe
many bottlenecks, as the a/A battle continues).
In contrast, a positive value of q stabilizes the system,
preserving a balanced polymorphism in host resistance
alleles. Indeed, at the GFG end HA manages to successfully
invade once and then coexist with the resident Ha due to the
extra link in the network (electronic supplementary
material, S6, its virus VA is devoting part of its resources
to attack Ha too) and because the costs of generalism
come into play: the binding efficiency of VA to HA is
lower; the intrinsic growth rate of HA is also lower due to
the cost of generalism, paradoxically raising its chances of
a successful invasion. It seems that these costs of generalism
increase the period of the HA–VA host–parasite oscillation,
thus enabling the successful establishment of HA (see
electronic supplementary material, S7).
(c) Coevolution and cooperation
We now study the full model of §2c, where there is a
cooperation–defection dilemma for the hosts, as well as
host–parasite coevolution. We can now ask: what is the
host population size, K (×104)
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Figure 2. Average relative fitness of cooperators with respect
to defectors, measured by the quantity log10 v (see §3a and
the electronic supplementary material, S2), as a function
of the initial fraction of cooperators and of the host popu-
lation size. The frequency-dependent effect depicted in
figure 1 breaks down at low densities. In this scenario, the
virus does not evolve—but hosts may mutate to a resistant
form. Parameter values are b1¼ 0, w ¼ 0, mcd ¼ mH ¼
1024 h21, 1000 runs per parameter set; other parameters
and initial conditions as in figure 1.
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Figure 3. Host genotype substitution dynamics along the
MA–GFG continuum in the host–parasite coevolution
model (see §§2b and 3b). Number of a/A flips in a 1000 h
interval; we consider that there is a flip every time that the frac-
tion of type a hosts drops below 0.95. Averages and +1 s.d.
over 500 runs are shown. Parameter values: z ¼ 0, b ¼ 1 h21,
K ¼ b/c ¼ 106 ml21, mH ¼ mV ¼ 1025 h21, p ¼ 1026 ml h21,
pg ¼ 0.1p, y ¼ 30, d ¼ 0.2 h21, volume ¼ 1 ml. Initial
conditions: Va ¼ 106 ml21, Ha ¼ 102 ml21, VA ¼HA ¼ 0.
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fate of cooperation as we move along the host–parasite speci-
ficity continuum from MA (q¼ 0) to GFG (q¼ 1) limits?
The MA model is associated with a diversification of
both host and parasite genotypes [44] and so at first
sight is the most inimical to the preservation of
cooperation, which is typically favoured by local genetic
homogeneity [45]. However, we find that cooperation
is most robust to cheater invasion in the MAs limit
(figure 4). The probability of defector takeover grows
with q as we move from MA to GFG (figure 4). In
other words, cooperation is maintained for longer periods
if host–parasite specificity is MA-like. This result is
robust across a large region of parameter space (although
system stability may be limited—see §3b).
The non-intuitive association between diversifying MA-
type interactions and the preservation of cooperation can be
understood when it is recognized that the diversifying selec-
tion is not acting on the cooperation locus, but only on the
resistance locus. The result of the continual strong alternat-
ing selection on resistance is a continual cycle of genetic
bottlenecks purging diversity at linked loci, which here
means the cooperation locus. In the MA limit, recurrent
a/A bottlenecks prevent rare defectors from invading—so
cooperation is maintained (any DA defectors that may
have arisen are wiped out, just like the majority of CA, due
to the burst in VA). On the contrary, in the GFG limit, a
single switch from a to A hosts paves the way for subsequent
defector takeover on a static A allele background. Examples
of the corresponding typical time series are shown in the
electronic supplementary material, figure S3.
We show that the genetic structure of host–parasite
interaction influences the outcome of their coevolutionary
dynamics. These dynamics in turn determine the
structuring of the host population via genetic bottlenecks,
which we find to be more numerous towards the MA end
of the MA–GFG continuum. Population bottlenecks are
known to influence the social behaviour of the host [46],
favouring cooperation.
(d) Spatial structure
The assumption that individuals encounter one another at
random in well-mixed populations is made primarily for
mathematical simplicity and tractability [47,48]. In natural
populations, however, this assumption is misplaced.
Biological populations are largely broken up into subpopu-
lations linked loosely by migration [49,50], known as a
metapopulation. Within a single patch, cheats have a selec-
tive advantage and cooperation inevitably breaks down
[51–53]. However, in the context of a metapopulation,
cooperating demes grow to higher densities than cheating
demes, enabling cooperation to persist across a spatially
structured population [51–53].
In order to interpret our results in a metapopulation
context, we explore how the dynamics within a patch
is altered after a single migration event in a host-
evolution-only scenario (as in §3a). Each combination
of arriving and resident genotype is tested, for different
values of the migrant-to-resident ratio and of the time
of arrival. See the electronic supplementary material, S5
for details and figures. In contrast to the classical invasion
hierarchy between cooperators and defectors, we find that
rare cooperators can successfully invade locally abundant
defectors if they carry the favourable resistance allele.
Of course, the converse also holds, defectors can readily
invade cooperators if they carry an additional resistance
advantage (see the electronic supplementary material,
figure S5). If, however, both are susceptible, resident
cooperators have a high chance of resisting an invasion
(within our observation time window) unless the migrant
defectors are very numerous. Regarding relative timings,
the later the resistant migrants arrive, the higher the
chance that the residents have already evolved a resistant
mutation themselves—which neutralizes the competitive
advantage of the migrants.
A complete study involving repeated migration and
coevolution in a full metapopulation setting is outside
the scope of this article. We have, however, examined
the two key issues, invasion hierarchies and the longevity
of cooperator patches. In figure 4, we demonstrate how
the combination of interaction genetics and coevolution
can define the longevity of cooperator patches, in the
face of defector challenge. Specifically, we find that in
the MA limit, defector invasion is much impaired and
so cooperator patches are able to persist for longer,
increasing the global prevalence of cooperation across a
metapopulation. Expanding our theoretical framework
to incorporate more complex mechanisms of interaction
(e.g. inverse GFG, multi-locus interactions, [14,21]) and
non-random host–parasite interactions will present impor-
tant challenges for future work. Alongside theoretical
development, further experimental tests are vital, and also
offer important applied considerations.
(e) Applied context
Our theoretical analysis has largely been grounded in
the biology of bacteria-phage interactions [29]. This
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Figure 4. Probability of defector takeover across the MA–
GFG continuum (MA q ¼ 0, GFG q ¼ 1) in the full coevolu-
tion and cooperation model (see §§2c and 3c) for different
costs of generalism z. We plot the fraction of runs where
defectors grow to be more than 99 per cent of the initially
cooperator-only host population, within a 2000 h time
window of observation and subject to non-extinction of the
system (more than 85% of runs are stable in this case). Par-
ameter values are pg ¼ 0.01 p, w ¼ 0.2 h21, K ¼ b0/c ¼
106 ml21, b1¼ 0.2 b0, mV ¼ mH ¼ mcd ¼ 1025 h21, 1000
runs per set, other parameters as in figure 2. Initial con-
ditions: Va ¼ 106 ml21, Ca ¼ 102 ml21, VA ¼ CA ¼ Da ¼
DA ¼ 0. Cooperation is maintained for longer times under
a MA model of specificity.
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interaction has enormous public health interest [54], due
to the clinical importance of bacterial pathogens and the
increasing interest in the use of ‘phage therapy’ as a
novel mechanism of pathogen control [55,56]. Electronic
supplementary material, figure S4 highlights a concern
for phage therapy—the administration of a lethal phage
virus does not always result in the eradication of the
target bacterial population, even in the absence of spatial
structure. For much of the parameter range, the bacterial
population evolves resistance to the phage and continues
to persist, despite the ability of the phage to co-evolve and
chase the bacteria through genotype space.
We go on to show that the nature of this coevolutionary
persistence has great significance for the fate of bacterial
cooperation, defining the ability of cooperators to resist
local replacement by cheats. Bacterial cooperation typi-
cally involves the secretion of shared extracellular
enzymes, toxins and polymers—important virulence fac-
tors when released within a human host [45,57].
Therefore, the coevolutionary interaction with phages
may have an important impact on the virulence of bac-
terial pathogens. In the MA limit, diversifying selection
on bacterial resistance alleles will pose a formidable
barrier to the invasion of cheats from rare, increasing
the resistance of resident wild-type bacteria to recently
proposed mechanisms of pathogen control via the intro-
duction of ‘Trojan Horse’ cheater lineages [58,59].
A recent study has demonstrated that coevolutionary
arms races between bacteria and phage decelerate over
time [43], giving way to fluctuating selection. Moreover,
bacteria-phage coevolution within natural soil commu-
nities follows an FSD [60]. These results suggests that
MA-type dynamics, characteristic of fluctuating selection,
are likely to be important in determining the phenotypic
properties of parasite and host populations. Given the
positive effect on cooperation at the MA extreme, this
highlights the potential of our model to help explain the
maintenance of cooperation in natural populations in a
broader context.
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